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FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief, Case No. 21010 
Driver License Services, 
Department of Public Safety, 
State of Utah, : 
Respondent. : 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a trial de novo after an 
administrative revocation of appellant's driver license by the 
Department of Public Safety, Driver License Services, pursuant 
to Title 41, Chapter 6, Section 44.10, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
A trial de novo was held in the Third Judicial District 
Court before the Honorable Dean Conder, Judge presiding. The 
court denied appellant's motion to reinstate her driver license 
on October 23, 1985. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order from this court to have her 
driver license reinstated by respondent. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Was appellant clearly warned of the consequences of a 
refusal to take a chemical test after she was arrested for 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and did appellant's 
volitional actions clearly indicate an intention to refuse to 
submit to such a test? 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 27, 1985, at approximately 2:15 a.m., Salt 
Lake City Police Officer Scott Gardner observed appellant 
driving south bound on West Temple Street in Salt Lake City. 
(Tr. 3) At 600 South appellant made a right-hand turn, result-
ing in her driving the wrong way on a one-way street. (Tr. 4) 
She then turned left at the next intersection and pulled into a 
hotel parking lot. (Tr. 4) The officer had been following her 
with his overhead lights on as she drove on 600 South. He then 
approached her in the hotel parking lot. (Tr. 4-6) 
At that time the officer detected an odor of alcohol, 
noticed that her eyes were somewhat bloodshot, and observed 
that she was unsteady on her feet. (Tr. 6) He reguested that 
she perform several field sobriety tests, and also informed her 
that she need not take those tests if she did not want to. 
(Tr. 13) At that time, the passenger in her car began to talk 
to appellant, thus interfering with the officer, and distracting 
appellant. (Tr. 12) Appellant then refused to perform the 
field sobriety tests. (Tr. 7, 13) 
Appellant was placed under arrest for driving under 
the influence of alcohol. (Tr. 14) The officer handcuffed 
appellant and she began to cry. (Tr. 14) He then drove her to 
the Salt Lake County Jail. In the parking lot at the jail, the 
officer read the three admonitions off the "DUI Report Form"! 
as appellant continued to cry. He waited another ten minutes 
and tried to explain the implied consent law to appellant. 
(Tr. 8-10) Appellant at one time stated "you are going to ruin 
my job", then continued to cry without verbally responding to 
his requests. (Tr. 8-10) 
After hearing these facts, the trial court ruled that 
crying, in and of itself, is not an indication that a person does 
not hear or understand what is said and that a witness heard 
that which was audibly announced. (Tr. 21) The request for 
reinstatement was denied. (Tr. 21) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant's reactions to the officer's requests for a 
chemical test of her blood alcohol level did not indicate that 
she understood the consequences of a failure to submit to such 
a test. Likewise, her conduct did not clearly indicate a 
volitional refusal to submit to such a test. 
ARGUMENT 
APPELLANT WAS NOT CLEARLY INFORMED OF THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING TO SUBMIT TO A 
CHEMICAL TEST OF HER BLOOD ALCOHOL CONTENT, 
NOR DID HER ACTIONS CLEARLY INDICATE AN 
INTENTION TO REFUSE TO SUBMIT TO SUCH A 
TEST. 
Before one's driver license may be revoked for a 
1. The admonitions as described in the standard DUI Report 
Form are attached in the Addendum, and the officer's reading is 
reproduced on pages 6-7, infra. 
refusal to submit to a chemical test,certain statutory prerequi-
sites must be met by the arresting officer. Those are described 
in Utah Code Annotated, §41-6-44.10(2) (1953 as amended) which 
provides in part: 
If the person has been placed under arrest 
and has thereafter been requested by a 
peace officer to submit to any one or more 
of the chemical tests provided for in 
subsection (1) of this section and refuses 
to submit to the chemical test or tests, 
the person shall be warned by a peace 
officer requesting the test or tests that a 
refusal to submit to the test or tests can 
result in revocation of his license to 
operate a motor vehicle. Following this 
warning, unless the person immediately 
requests the chemical test or tests as 
offered by a peace officer be administered, 
no test shall be given and a peace officer 
shall submit a sworn report. 
This court has interpreted this statute to contain 
several mandatory aspects: 
The important and mandatory aspects of this 
subsection are: after his arrest, the 
person should be informed which chemical 
test the officer has designated, and the 
consequences of his refusal to submit to 
the requested test. To comply with the 
mandate of the statute, the refusal and the 
advice, as to the resulting consequences, 
must be within the same time frame, but not 
necessarily within a precise sequence 
they are integral to each other, and must 
be so administered. Elliot v. Dorius, 557 
P.2d 759, 762 (Ut. 1976) 
This court has also described the officer's duties 
with respect to the nature of the warnings: 
The officer is responsible for making this 
clear to the arrested motorist, and this 
duty must be discharged in a fashion that 
will clearly alert the driver to the 
consequences of a refusal whether expressed 
verbally or implied from his conduct and 
words. Holman v. Coxf 598 P.2d 1331f 1334 
(Ut. 1979) 
This court has also described the officer's duties 
with respect to the nature of the warnings: 
The officer is responsible for making this 
clear to the arrested motorist, and this 
duty must be discharged in a fashion that 
will clearly alert the driver to the 
conseguences of a refusal whether expressed 
verbally or implied from his conduct and 
words. Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331, 1334 
(Ut. 1979) 
In Holmanf this court went on to hold that if the 
rights and obligations of the driver under the implied consent 
statute are not made clear to him, then it would be improper to 
revoke his driver license. 
Holman also addressed the issue of what constitutes a 
refusal to take a test: 
Obviously the arresting officer cannot know 
the subjective state of mind of the person 
arrested and whether he in fact intended 
his response to a reguest to take a blood 
test to be the eguivalent of a refusal that 
would result in license revocation. The 
test must be objective; otherwise the whole 
statutory scheme could be subverted by one 
who eguivocates or remains silent, and 
later protests that it was his unexpressed 
intent to take the test. However, the 
behavior of the driver must clearly indi-
cate, judged objectively, that the driver 
intended to refuse to take the test. 
[Citations ommitted] 
When an officer is confronted by a hostile 
driver, it is important that the personal 
animosities that may arise not be used as 
the basis for a conclusion by the officer 
that the driver refused. Rather, the ac-
tual behavior of the driver, as would be 
judged by a disinterested bystander, should 
be the basis for such a conclusion* [Em-
phasis added] 598 P.2d at 1331. 
The officer's testimony on direct examination regard-
ing the requests for a chemical test and appellant's responses 
was as follows: 
Q. [By Mr. Hale] After reading what is 
known as the .08 admonition did you request 
that she take a chemical test? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And what test did you request? 
A. Breath test. 
Q. And what was her response to your re-
quest? 
A. While I was reading these she was 
continually crying; and when I asked her 
what is your response on [sic] my request you 
submit to a chemical test, she continued to 
cry? but she says, "You're going to ruin my 
job." 
0. Ok. So she was cryinq and upset. Did 
she give any indications that she did not 
understand what your request was? 
A. No. 
Q. Say anything or do anythinq? 
A. No. That's all she said at that time. 
Q. The second admonition, would you read 
that as you read it to her that evening? 
A. If you refuse, a test will not be given; 
however, I must warn you, that if you do 
refuse your license or permit to drive a 
motor vehicle can be revoked for one year 
with no provision for a limited driver's 
license. 
After you've taken this test, you'll be 
permitted to have a physician of your own 
choice, administer a test at your own 
expense, in addition to the one that I 
requested you to submit to, so long as it 
does not delay the test or tests requested 
by me. Upon your request, I'll make 
available to you, the results of the test 
if you take it. 
Q. Did you again request her to take the 
test? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And what was the response? 
A. She continued crying. 
Q. There is another admonition there; did 
you read that to her? 
A. Yes, I did. 
0. Would you read it as you did then, 
please? 
A. Your right to remain silent and your 
right to counsel do not apply to the implied 
consent law, which is civil in nature and 
separate from the criminal charges. Your 
right to remain silent does not give you 
the right to refuse to take the test. You 
do not have the right to have counsel during 
the test procedure. Unless you submit to 
the test I am requesting, I'll consider 
that you have refused to take the test. I 
warn you, that if you refuse to take the 
test, your driving license can be revoked 
for one year with no provision for a limited 
license. 
Q. Did you again make the request for a 
breath test? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And what was the response? 
A. There was no response; she continued 
crying. 
Q. Now, you've written in some language 
there below that admonition. Would you 
explain that? 
A. Oh, yeah. She did state that. She 
said, "Please help me", and then she 
continued to cry. (Tr. 8-10) 
The officer indicated that he waited another ten 
minutes, during that time the appellant continued to cry, he 
then tried to explain the implied consent law to her, but again 
she continued to cry. (Tr. 10) On cross examination the 
officer indicated that appellant gave no acknowledgment that 
she had heard what was read to her (Tr. 18-19) nor was the 
officer observing her reactions to these admonitions other than 
to hear her continuous crying. (Tr. 19) 
This court has previously dealt with "constructive 
refusals" in a number of cases. In Mathie v. Schwendiman, 656 
P.2d 463 (Ut. 1982) , after being stopped for weaving and speeding, 
the defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of 
alcohol. He agreed to take a chemical test but refused to 
remove the chewing gum from his mouth. This court held that 
even though the driver agreed to take a test, the volitional 
failure to do what is necessary to perform a chemical test 
constituted a refusal. 
In Beck v. Cox, 597 P.2d 1335 (Ut. 1979), the defen-
dant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. 
After being informed of the consequences of a refusal the 
driver responded "I'm a criminal, yeah, yeah, yeah, I'm a 
criminal". When asked if he would take a test, the driver 
responded "I don't know". A fourth, and final request was made 
and the driver refused to respond. This court held that there 
need not be an express refusal to take the chemical test, but 
that a volitional failure to perform an act necessary to the 
proper completion of the test constitutes a refusal. In both 
of these cases it is important to note that both drivers acknow-
ledged, through either words or conduct, that a chemical test 
had been requested. 
By way of contrast, in Hyde v. Dorius, 549 P.2d 451 
(Ut. 1976), the defendant was arrested for driving under the 
influence of alcohol and requested to take a chemical test. 
When informed of the consequences of a refusal to take the test 
she stated that the police did not know what they were talking 
about. She then began to cry and scream and became very belli-
gerent. She subsequently took two field sobriety tests but was 
never again offered the opportunity to take a chemical test. 
The court ordered the defendant's license reinstated, in doing 
so, two of the justices held that an express refusal was neces-
sary to invoke the statutory sanctions of license revocation. 
One justice held that the facts did not justify such a revoca-
tion. The requirement for an express refusal was rejected in 
Beck v. Cox, supra. However, appellant submits that Hyde v. 
Dorius, supra, may still be read to stand for the proposition 
that the facts there were insufficient to establish a volitional 
refusal. 
In the instant case, the evidence indicates that ap-
pellant was extremely upset and crying as the required admoni-
tions were read to her. The trial court ruled that, by being 
present when something is said, a witness hears and understands 
it. (Tr. 21) The effect of the trial court's ruling is that an 
officer need merely read the admonitions no matter what the 
mental condition of the driver is. The case law from this 
court is contrary to this holding. As described above, the 
driver must be clearly alerted to the consequences of a refusal, 
and furthermore, the driver's actions must clearly indicate an 
intent to refuse to take the chemical test. Holman v. Cox, 
supra. In the instant case, neither of these requirements were 
met. There is nothing to indicate that appellant was in fact 
listening to the officer's admonitions, let alone understanding 
them. Furthermore, there were no actions taken by appellant 
evidencing any intent to refuse to submit to the requested 
test. Consequently, appellant's driver license should be or-
dered to be reinstated. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence here is insufficient to support the 
finding that the arresting officer described the consequences 
of a refusal to take a chemical test in a fashion that would 
clearly alert the driver of those consequences. Further, 
appellant's actions did not constitute a clear indication of 
her intent to refuse to take a chemical test. 
Dated this day of January, 1986. 
G. FRED METOS 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies 
were mailed/delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 236 
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, on this 
day of January, 1986. 
ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Annotated 
§41-6-44.10 (1953 as amended) 
(1) Any person operating a motor vehicle in this state shall be 
deemed to have given his consent to a chemical test or tests of 
his breath, bloodf or urine for the purpose of determining 
whether he was driving or in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while having a blood alcohol content statutorily pro-
hibited , or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, 
or combination of alcohol and any drug as detailed in section 
41-6-44, so long as the test is or tests are administered at 
the direction of a peace officer having grounds to believe that 
person to have been driving or in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content statutorily 
prohibited, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, 
or combination of alcohol and any drug as detailed in section 
41-6-44. A peace officer shall determine which of the aforesaid 
tests shall be administered. 
No person who has been requested under this section to submit 
to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine, 
shall have the right to select the test or tests to be 
administered. The failure or inability of a peace officer to 
arrange for any specific test is not a defense with regard to 
taking a test requested by a peace officer and it shall not be 
a defense in any criminal, civil or administrative proceeding 
resulting from a person's refusal to submit to the requested 
test or tests. 
(2) If the person has been placed under arrest and has thereafter 
been requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more 
of the chemical tests provided for in subsection (1) of this 
section and refuses to submit to the chemical test or tests, 
the person shall be warned by a peace officer requestinq the 
test or tests that a refusal to submit to the test or tests can 
result in revocation of his license to operate a motor vehicle. 
Following this warning, unless the person immediately requests 
the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer be 
administered, no test shall be given and a peace officer shall 
submit a sworn report, within five days after the date of the 
arrest, that he had grounds to believe the arrested person had 
been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while having a blood alcohol content statutorily pro-
hibited or while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or 
combination of alcohol and any drug as detailed in section 
41-6-44 and that the person had refused to submit to a chemical 
test or tests as set forth in subsection (1) of this section. 
Within 20 days after receiving a sworn report from a peace 
ADDENDUM CONTINUED 
U.C.A. §41-6-44.10 (1953 as amended) continued 
officer to the effect that the person has refused a chemical 
test or tests the department shall notify the person of a 
hearing before the department. If at that hearing the department 
determines that the person was granted the right to submit to a 
chemical test or tests as set forth in subsection (1) of this 
section. Within 20 days after receiving a sworn report from a 
peace officer to the effect that the person has refused a 
chemical test or tests the department shall notify the person 
of a hearing before the department. If at that hearing the 
department determines that the person was granted the right to 
submit to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to the 
test or tests, or if the person fails to appear before the 
department as required in the notice, the department shall 
revoke for one year his license or permit to drive. The 
department shall also assess against the person, in addition to 
any fee imposed under subsection 41-2-8(7), a fee of $25, which 
must be paid before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, 
to cover administrative costs, and which fee shall be cancelled 
if the person obtains an unappealed court decision following a 
proceeding allowed under this subsection that the revocation 
was not proper. Any person whose license has been revoked by 
the department under the provisions of this section shall have 
the right to file a petition within 30 days thereafter for a 
hearing in the matter in the district court in the county in 
which the person resides. The court is hereby vested with 
jurisdiction, and it shall set the matter for trial do novo 
upon 10-days1 written notice to the department and thereupon 
take testimony and examine into the facts of the case and 
determine whether the petitioner's license is subject to revoca-
tion under the provisions of this chapter. 
Admonitions from the DUI Report Form 
Results indicating .08% or more by weight of alcohol in your 
blood shall, and the existence of a blood alcohol content or 
presence of drugs sufficient to render you incapable of safely 
driving a vehicle can, result in suspension or revocation of 
your license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle. 
If you refuse the test, it will not be given, however I must 
warn you that if you refuse, your license or permit to drive a 
motor vehicle can be revoked for one year with no provision for 
a limited driver's license. After you have taken this test, 
you will be permitted to have a physician of your own choice 
administer a test at your own expense in addition to the one I 
have requested you to submit to, so long as it does not delay 
ADDENDUM CONTINUED 
Admonitions from the DUI Report Form continued 
the test or tests requested by me. Upon your request, I will 
make available to you the result of the test if you take it. 
Your right to remain silent and your right to counsel does not 
apply to the implied consent law which is civil in nature and 
separate from the criminal charges. Your right to remain silent 
does not give you the right to refuse to take the test. You do 
not have the right to have counsel during the test procedure. 
Unless you submit to the test I am reguestinq, I will consider 
that you have refused to take the test. I warn you that if you 
refuse to take the test, your driver's license can be revoked 
for one year with no provision for a limited license. 
